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NOTE
Legal Aspects of Membership In The Organization of African
Unity: The Case of The Western Sahara
by Anthony G. Pazzanita*
I. INTRODUCTION
The North African territory known as the Western Sahara seems, at firstglance, an unlikely place for a conflict that has severely tested the
structure and even the existence of a major regional international organi-
zation. However, since the Western Sahara was freed of its European
colonizer, Spain, in 1976, (and to a greater degree for international legal
purposes, since about 1981) the Western Sahara issue has immersed the
African continent in controversy. The issue concerns the granting of
membership status in the Organization of African Unity (OAt) to a pur-
portedly independent Western Sahara, represented by a political and mil-
itary group claiming to speak for the inhabitants of the territory.' What
makes the dispute more interesting-and severe-is that portions of
Western Sahara are still occupied by a neighboring state and OAU mem-
ber, the Kingdom of Morocco, which has a competing claim to the entire
country.2 The issue has on several occasions threatened to paralyze to-
tally the OAU and quite possibly to splinter it completely along political,
ideological, and even regional lines.3 The admission of the Saharan Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR), as the independent Western Sahara calls
itself,4 to the OAU has caused the gravest crisis in the OAU's 20-year
history. A protest boycott led by Morocco and joined by other sympa-
thetic states has, at times, threatened the whole organization with
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University (1985); B.A., Franklin and Marshall Col-
lege (1981).
1 T. HODGES, WESTERN SAHARA: THE RooTS OF A DESERT WAR 337-46 (1983).
2 Id. at 85-86.
3 For an overview of the publicity on the conflict, see N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, at A6, col. 1;
id., Mar. 8, 1982, at A5, col. 1; id, Mar. 14, 1982, at 8, col. 1; id., July 25, 1982, at 11, col. 1; id.,
July 28, 1982, at A5, col. 5; id. June 10, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
4 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 238.
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collapse.'
Despite the problems the Western Sahara dispute has caused the
OAU, it is by no means solely a legal, political, or diplomatic concern;
those issues have grown out of (and contributed to) one of Africa's most
persistent military contests. Since 1976, Morocco and the forces seeking
to oust it from Western Sahara have fought with increasing intensity and
with weapons of steadily increasing sophistication. 6 This military situa-
tion has also involved several other OAU member states and has indi-
rectly involved outside powers.
The Western Sahara conflict, including the OAU membership issue,
is primarily political in nature and has created fairly sharp divisions
among the Organization's member states.7 The following article will not
address these issues in any significant sense. Rather it will explore the
legal aspects and problems of the SADR membership dispute, especially
those found from a reading of the OAU Charter itself.8 The legal ques-
tions relate to sovereignty, statehood, recognition, and decolonization of
territories in the face of competing claims. The analysis below will ex-
amine generally recognized principles of international law, concerns pe-
culiar to Africa and to the OAU Charter, other appropriate constituent
documents of international organizations, factual information, and the
behavior of other actors on the international legal scene. When possible,
and appropriate, the article will examine prior instances of similar situa-
tions on the African continent relating either to OAU membership or
other international legal concepts of importance in the affairs of Africa.
The overarching purposes of this study need to be kept firmly in
mind. The factual and historical-political information concerning the
Western Sahara which bears on the legal issues, the treatment of those
issues and the legal arguments which follow them, is developed with two
objectives in mind: The first is to attempt, by means of international law,
to carry the Western Sahara dispute beyond the level of political maneu-
vering by African and other states and beyond the ideological factional-
ism and military and political influence exercised by outside powers.
This analysis will carry with it at least the seeds of the eventual resolu-
tion of the conflict through the use of international law. Second, in order
to put the dispute onto a different plane, the legal perspective will be as
broad as possible. It will encompass most, if not all, of the relevant OAU
Charter provisions, the policies which those provisions express, and the
5 N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
6 Id., Nov. 23, 1981, at A6, col. 1; id., Oct. 15, 1981, at A8, col. 6; id, Nov. 15, 1981, at 18,
ol. 1.
7 Id., Mar. 14, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
8 See ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER arts. 2(1)(c), 2(1)(d), 3(3), 3(6), 4, 28,
reprinted in BAsIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-78, 83 (I. Brownlie ed. 1983) [herein-
after cited as OAU CHARTER].
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accompanying commentary on those provisions. It is precisely the use of
multiple provisions of the OAU Charter and related outside sources that
has been lacking in the previous literature on the subject. The following
analysis is crucial to a thorough coverage of the conflict, and will greatly
illuminate some general principles of international law. Most impor-
tantly, it will provide a necessary glimpse into international legal
problems pertaining to Africa and into the workings and policies of Af-
rica's primary international organization.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History and Recent Events
The Western Sahara is a territory about as large as Great Britain
and is one of the most remote areas on Earth. It covers about 102,700
square miles, most of which is flat, monotonous gravel desert.9 It is situ-
ated along the Atlantic coast of north-west Africa (it has a 660-mile sea-
coast) and borders three other states, two of which either have or have
had claims to the territory: Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria.'0 These
boundaries are mostly undemarcated, although no segment of the border
seems to be the subject of any legal or political dispute."
Western Sahara has only two major known natural resources. One
is phosphates, most of which are found (and were mined until the conflict
terminated operations) in the northern third of the country, especially in
the vicinity of Bou-Craa, a small desert outpost about 50 miles from the
Mauritanian border.12 The second is fisheries, which are considered ex-
tremely abundant. However, they are largely unexploited at present, due
to a variety of factors: 1) the conflict itself; 2) strong ocean currents off
the coast that make shipping dangerous; and 3) the lack of adequate
transportation. 13
The population of the territory is the subject of much dispute.
When proposals are made by interested parties for a referendum to de-
cide the Western Sahara's future, the number of indigenous persons to be
allowed to vote is a major point of contention.' 4 This is complicated by
the fact that many inhabitants are in refugee camps, where they fled after
the division of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania.'" Fur-
9 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at ix, ii (map). See also BUR. PUB. AFF., DEP'T STATE, BACK-
GROUND NOTES: MOROCCO 6 (Apr. 1982).
10 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at I.
11 Id. at 45.
12 Id. at 126-28.
13 Id. at 14.
14 Id. at 312. See also N.Y. Times, June 27, 1981, at 5, col 1.; id., July 7, 1981, at A3, col. 5.
15 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 232-34. See also Mercer, The Sahrawis of Western Sahara, in
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT No. 40 at 5 (1979).
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thermore, the population is traditionally nomadic, and thus difficult to
count, although it appears that most began to abandon this way of life in
the early 1970s. 6 A Spanish census conducted in 1974 showed 73,497
native Saharans, but other estimates have ranged from about 200,000 to
upwards of 500,000. 17 There are only three towns of consequence in the
territory: Smara in the northern interior, Dakhla (formerly Villa Cis-
neros) and El-Ayoun, both on the coast. The latter had served since
1958 as the administrative "capital" when Western Sahara was under
Spanish control.
18
It appears to be generally accepted-but not by Morocco, which
lays claim to the territory-that the inhabitants of the Western Sahara
(called Sahrawis) constitute a distinct and identifiable ethnic and national
group; a fact obviously of critical importance. 9 The population com-
prises various tribal groupings whose attachments to the land are of long
standing, easily predating the arrival of Spanish colonizers in the late
19th century. 0 However, due to the undemarcated and uncontrolled
borders, the traditional nomadism of the inhabitants, and the proximity
of other states such as Mauritania, the Sahrawis often closely resemble
their Mauritanian and other Saharan counterparts in appearance, cus-
toms, and the like.2 1
Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, was one of Spain's few
possessions in Africa.zz Various commercial and governmental interests
spearheaded the occupation of the coastal towns in the mid-1880s. It
was not until the 1930s that Spain extended its control to the interior of
the territory, 3 with the assistance of the French armed forces who were
then engaged in quelling a rebellion in adjacent Morocco, then under
French control. Given the lateness of this chain of events, it is stated
that "the Sahrawis were among the last African peoples to submit to
colonial domination."'24 The boundaries of the territory had been final-
16 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 131.
17 Id. at 131-32. See also Iseman, The War in the Sahara, HARPER'S, Sept. 1980, at 54.
18 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 139.
19 For discussion see, V. THOMPSON & R. ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS: BACK-
GROUND TO CONFLICT 115-16 (1980).
20 Historically, the largest and most organized tribal group in the Western Sahara is the
Reguibat "Confederation." "No matter which government eventually wins control of the Western
Sahara, it will have to deal with the Reguibat as the strongest indigenous force in the area." Id. at
315.
21 Id. at 116.
22 G. FREEMAN-GRENVILLE, A MODERN ATLAS OF AFRICAN HISTORY 46-50 (1976). Spain's
only other African possessions were Equitorial Guinea (Fernando Po and Rio Muni) and small
portions of northern Morocco (including the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which Spain continues
to occupy). Id.




ized by treaty in 1900 and once again in 1912.25
As a result of the growing anti-colonial sentiment among peoples
after the Second World War, Spain over time came under increasing
pressure from the United Nations, the OAU, and others to relinquish
control over "Spanish Sahara.",26 It finally did so in 1976 amid much
activity by most of the concerned parties. A United Nations Visiting
Mission was sent to the still-Spanish territory in mid-1975 to ascertain
the wishes of the people and found "there was an overwhelming consen-
sus among Saharans within the territory in favour of independence and
opposing integration with any neighboring country."'27 Unknown at first
to most Sahrawis, however, Spain agreed to withdraw from the territory
in February 1976. The Western Sahara was divided between Morocco
and Mauritania by means of an agreement reached among the three
states in late 1975; the northern two-thirds would go to Morocco and the
southern one-third would be ceded to Mauritania.28
This division of territory was done in spite of the issuance shortly
beforehand of an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Jus-
tice.2 9 The opinion held that claims to the Western Sahara by Morocco
and Mauritania were not persuasive and did not override the rights of the
native inhabitants to self-determination and independence.30 In addition
to this factor, the agreement struck between the three states made no
reference to the organization which came to represent, by many ac-
counts, 31 the opinions and aspirations of most Sahrawis; that is, the
25 Id. at 45-48.
26 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2072, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 59-60, U.N. Doe. A/6104
(1965); G.A. Res. 2229, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 72-73, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res.
3292, 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (relating to self-determination
for the Spanish Sahara).
27 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 199 (quoting Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to
Spanish Sahara, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/10023/Rev.1 (1975)). The
Mission consisted of representatives of the Ivory Coast, Cuba, and Iran.
28 Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 715 (1976). The exact division
of territory was not agreed upon until April 14, 1976. For a detailed description, see T. HODGES,
supra note 1, at 237. In the time since the agreement, the conflict and the legal and diplomatic
activities involved have combined to make the "Madrid Accord" progressively less important as a
matter of international law. In December, 1984, Spain voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly
Resolution urging Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to engage in direct negotiations with a
view towards cessation of hostilities. Although the precise meaning of this action is not entirely
clear at this writing, it is said by one source that "Spain's vote. . . was interpreted as a repudiation
of the 'tripartite agreement' (Spain, Morocco, Mauritania) of 1975 which handed the former Spanish
territory over to Morocco." AFRICA, Jan. 1985, at 26.
29 Concerning Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16, 1975). See also T. HODGES, supra note
1, at 368-72; infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
30 1975 I.C.J. at 68.
31 Regarding the popularity of the Frente POLISARIO as seen by Spanish observers and the
1975 U.N. Visiting Mission, see T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 197-99; V. THOMPSON & R. ADLOFF,
supra note 19, at 17-18.
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Frente POLISARIO.3 2 This group was founded in 1973 to combat the
Spanish presence, but later shifted its attention to Morocco and Maurita-
nia once the intentions of the two claimant states became apparent.33
Pursuant to the agreement, Spain gradually withdrew from the territory,
finally departing completely on February 26, 1976, and its place was
taken by the armed forces of the claimant states in their respective allot-
ted zones. 34 The Frente POLISARIO responded on the following day by
formally declaring and asserting, within the Western Saharan territory,
independence as a sovereign state. It was to be known henceforth as the
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, or SADR.35
Since that time, many changes have occurred, but a brief summary
of important events will suffice. Mauritania, its fragile economy devas-
tated by POLISARIO attacks, signed a peace treaty with the Saharan
organization in Algiers in 1979, in which it agreed to renounce its claim
to the Western Sahara.3 6 The Frente POLISARIO has continued its mil-
itary activities against Morocco, now claiming to control about 80 per-
cent of the territory.3 7 Morocco has annexed the country and calls it its
"Saharan provinces." It has consolidated its position only in the north-
ern one-sixth of the territory and that has been by constructing fortifica-
tions in the form of a 400 mile-long gravel wall or "berm," which
contains the phosphate mines and two of the three principal Western
Saharan towns.38 The Frente POLISARIO which controls most of the
remainder of the territory has, in addition to its military campaign,
pressed a legal, political, and diplomatic offensive against Morocco and
its allies. These efforts have been quite successful, as will become imme-
diately apparent after other relevant international legal factors are
addressed.
B. The LC.J. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975
After the Western Sahara decolonization issue had risen to promi-
32 Acronym for Frente Popular para ]a Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio do Oro (Popular
Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro).
33 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 161, 182.
34 Id. at 229-32 for detailed discussion of this phase in the conflict.
35 Vance, Recognition as an A.ffirmative Step in the Decolonization Process: The Case of Western
Sahara, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 45, 59-60 (1980). For a description of the event at which
independence was asserted, see T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 238. The SADR's first government was
formed on March 4, 1976. Id.
36 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1979, at A5, col. 1.
37 Regarding these claims, see T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 290 (reporter for French newspaper
Le Monde stated that during the 1200-mile journey across Western Sahara, no Moroccan presence
could be detected anywhere). See also, 19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 54 (Nov. 1982).
38 Concerning areas of POLISARIO and Moroccan control, see WEST AFRICA, March 29,
1982, at 861-62; id., May 7, 1984, at 970. For a map illustrating the approximate extent of Moroc-
can defenses, see id., May 7, 1984, at 970.
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nence, but before the formal takeover of the territory by the two claimant
states and the declaration of independence by the Frente POLISARIO,
the International Court of Justice rendered an Advisory Opinion on the
status of the country. This opinion was given in response to a request by
the United Nations General Assembly, embodied in Resolution
3292(XXIX) of December 13, 1974.11 The request was made to clarify
legal issues relating to the territory, especially in view of the fact that
Spain had earlier rejected contentious proceedings before the I.C.J.
against Morocco and Mauritania.4' The request itself comprised two
questions: First, at the time of colonization by Spain (that is, in about
1884), was the Western Sahara a territory belonging to no one (terra
nullius)? If not, the second question posed was whether there existed,
and what were the nature of the legal ties between the Western Sahara
and Morocco and between the territory and what is now the Islamic Re-
public of Mauritania.4 1
In its opinion, handed down in October 1975, the I.C.J. answered
the first question negatively: Western Sahara was not terra nullius in
1884. To reach this conclusion, it made use of the customary interna-
tional legal means of acquiring authority over territories at the time of
colonization-in the case at hand, in the late 19th century.42 At that
time, acquisition of sovereignty could be by one of two means: by occu-
pation of an empty land (terra nullius) or by means of agreements with
the indigenous inhabitants of the territory.43 If the land was inhabited by
peoples having social and political organization, it could not be terra nul-
lius and the consent of those peoples had to be obtained in order for
colonization and sovereignty to be valid.4 After considering the evi-
dence supplied by the parties, the Court concluded that at the time of
colonization, Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples who were, albeit
nomadic, "socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs
competent to represent them."'4 Therefore, their consent was needed for
Spain to validly assert its sovereign claim to the Western Sahara. Spain
39 G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
40 F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETING 407-08 (1977).
41 1975 I.CJ. at 37.
42 Id at 38-39.
43 Id. at 39.
44 The Court summarized the applicable international law partly as follows:
MTihe State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or
peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius ...
the acquisition of sovereignty was not generally considered as effected unilaterally through
'occupation' of terra nullius by original title but through agreements concluded with local




CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L
obtained the needed consent, and in so doing, further established that the
territory did not "belong to no one." As the Court interpreted Spain's
pattern of conduct,
[I]t did not proceed on the basis that it was establishing its sovereignty
over terra nullius. In its Royal Order of 26 December 1884. . .Spain
proclaimed that the King was taking [Western Sahara] under his pro-
tection on the basis of agreements which had been entered into with
the chiefs of the local tribes ....46
Having used the customary international law as it existed in 1884 to
decide this threshold question, the Court then considered the existence,
extent, and nature of any legal ties between the inhabitants of the West-
ern Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco and with Mauritania. This
issue was crucial, since both states claimed that extensive ties existed
with the Western Saharan tribes at the time of the Spanish colonization.
These ties were supposedly of such duration and degree that territorial
sovereignty would be proper over Western Sahara by both Morocco and
Mauritania.47 After hearing much evidence, the Court found that such
legal ties did exist as to both Morocco and Mauritania.48 However, these
ties were not as strong as the two claimant states argued. In the words of
the Court: "Those ties did not involve territorial sovereignty or co-sover-
eignty or territorial inclusion in a legal entity. . . the materials and in-
formation presented to [the Court] do not establish any tie of territorial
sovereignty between. . .Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco
or [Mauritania]." '49 The I.C.J. thus explicitly rejected any claims of sov-
ereignty over the Western Sahara by both states. Furthermore, since the
Court was mindful that the matter involved the decolonization of a de-
pendent territory, it concluded:
[T]he Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the
application of Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of the West-
ern Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination
through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of
the Territory ..
46 Id.
47 For extended and detailed discussion of the "legal ties" (which took the form of ties of
allegiance between Sahrawi tribal chiefs and the Sultan of Morocco and the Mauritanian authorities,
treaties, tax collections, etc.), see id. at 42-63.
4 8 The materials and information presented to the Court. . .show the existence. . . of
legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in...
Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating
to the land, which constituted legal ties between [Mauritania] and the territory of Western
Sahara.
Id. at 68.
49 Id. at 67-68.
5o Id. at 68.
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As the subsequent conduct of the claimant states discloses, the I.C.J.
Advisory Opinion was essentially disregarded. Morocco and Mauritania,
pursuant to their agreement with Spain,"1 marched into the territory in
February 1976 and occupied their respective portions of the Western Sa-
hara. Somewhat interestingly, Morocco claimed that the Advisory Opin-
ion had vindicated its claim to the land by allegedly emphasizing "legal
ties" to the exclusion of other factors, such as the principle of self-deter-
mination.52 The Frente POLISARIO, itself claiming vindication by the
main judicial body of the United Nations, began struggling to expel the
occupiers from what it considered to be its state: the SADR.
C. The Organization of African Unity
1. Formation, Charter, and Policies
After a series of meetings among many newly independent African
States in the early 1960's, the OAU was founded at a full assembly com-
prised of 31 African heads of state and foreign ministers in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia on May 25, 1963." 3 The OAU holds assemblies and periodic
summit meetings among African heads of state. It also has specialized
commissions dealing with a wide variety of social, political, and eco-
nomic matters relating to Africa, including health, nutrition, education,
scientific and technical, and defense concerns.5 In addition, the OAU
attempts to unify the legal and policy positions of African countries
through the commissions. In their international relations, particularly
regarding colonial dependency situations such as the Western Sahara and
southern Africa, there is also an attempt to achieve unity. The number
of states who are members of the OAU has grown, by virtue of the post-
war decolonization process, from the original 31 states (including Mo-
rocco) to 51 at the present time (if the SADR is counted).55 Because of
the near universality of its membership, the OAU is considered to be one
of the most important international organizations in the world; it is regu-
larly compared with the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization of
51 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52 Solarz, Arms for Morocco?, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 283 (1979-1980). See generally, T. HODGES,
supra note 1, at 210.
53 T. ELIAS, AFRIcA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-23 (1972).
540AU CHARTER, supra note 8, at art. 20. Distinct from the Specialized Commissions named
in Article 20 are the principal institutions of the OAU named in Article 7 of the Charter: the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and
the Commission on Mediation, Arbitration, and Conciliation. See T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 132.
55 THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS 365 (Y. EI-Ayouty & I. Zartman eds. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as El-Ayouty & Zartman].
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American States (OAS).56 Also, because of the number and diversity of
its members, the OAU is a respected voice in all matters concerning the
African continent.
As will be seen below, the Charter of the OAU contains many provi-
sions which, taken in some cases with outside commentary, are relevant
to substantive, as well as procedural, legal arguments to be made regard-
ing OAU membership status for the SADR. In addition, the Charter
reflects the concerns, aspirations, and priorities of the Organization and
its member states. This is made obvious by the fact that at both the
preliminary meetings concerning an African international organization
as well as at the 1963 Addis Ababa summit, which resulted in the signing
of the present Charter, explicit views on the problems of Africa were
articulated at length."
These views first found their final expression in the Preamble of the
Charter, where the basic principles (or "fundamental postulates") of the
Organization are enunciated. So important is this preambular language
considered that, according to one who was present, "almost half the time
spent on considering the Charter as a whole had been devoted to (the)
Preamble alone." 8 In addition to several general statements reflecting a
desire for African unity and progress, the Preamble contains language
which is more significant for its specificity. These sections refer to what
the Organization considers "the inalienable right of all people to control
their own destiny,"59 its determination "to safeguard and consolidate the
hard-won independence [and] the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
[African] States."6 Also expressed is an explicit adherence to the Char-
ter of the United Nations, which the states considered to be a "solid
foundation" to facilitate "peaceful and positive co-operation among
States."61 Says Elias: "All this may seem mere pious sentiment, but only
those who participated in or were present. . . could testify to the sincer-
ity and earnestness of purpose that prompted the particular formulation
56 For comparison of respective structures of the OAU, U.N., and OAS, see T. ELIAs, supra
note 53, at 123, 130-33.
57 The author states that he was "concerned in Addis Ababa in the drafting of the revised
Charter." Id. at 123.
58 Id. at 124-25.
59 The Preamble to the Charter of the OAU reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny;
Determined to safegard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of our States.
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the principles of which we reaffirm our adherance, provide a solid foundation for
peaceful and positive cooperation among states;






Turning to the substantive statements of the purposes and principles
of the OAU in the body of the Charter, it is apparent due to the fre-
quency of their mention that the same postulates stated in the Preamble
receive added weight. The purposes of the Organization are set forth in
article 2: they state, inter alia, that the OAU as an international organi-
zation shall defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and indepen-
dence of African States, to eliminate all forms of colonialism from
Africa, and to promote international cooperation, with "due regard" for
the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.6 3
For present purposes, it is important to note that the U.N. Charter
includes a provision establishing the International Court of Justice 64
(which rendered an Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara situation,
as discussed above).65 By extension, this could well mean there exists at
least some small degree of OAU connection to the Statute of the I.C.J.,
since article 1 of the Statute66 refers to the Charter as establishing the
Court as the principal U.N. judicial organ. This possible nexus between
the U.N. and OAU Charters will be important in regard to the principles
expressed in both the OAU and U.N. Charters and, of course, to the
significance of the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion.67
Briefly, the principles governing member states set out in article 3,
include: non-interference in the internal affairs of states (article 3(2)),
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for
their inalienable right to independent existence (article 3(3)), and a
strongly-worded commitment to the "total emancipation of the African
territories which are still dependent" (article 3(6))." In addition, article
6 of the Charter binds all member states (which have, per article 5, equal
rights and duties) to "observe scrupulously" the principles contained in
article 3.69 This language in article 6 exemplifies the extreme importance
62 T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 124.
63 Article 2 of the OAU Charter reads in relevant part:
1. The Organization shall have the following purposes:
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent of Africa; and
(e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 77.
64 U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96.
65 1975 I.C.J. 12.
66 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 1, reprinted in F. KIRGIS, supra
note 40, at 944.
67 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the U.N. and the OAU, see F.
OKOYE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW AFIcAN STATES 154-65 (1972).
68 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 77-78.
69 Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the OAU Charter read in relevant part:
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the framers of the Charter placed on the principles in article 3: "[I]t
might have been thought sufficient that these principles have been em-
bodied in the Charter, by which member States are already bound. But it
was finally agreed that these principles should be embodied in Article 6
1,70
Admission to membership in the OAU is a relatively simple matter,
although the Western Sahara membership has been plagued by proce-
dural problems at various times. Article 4 of the Charter states that
"each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a
Member of the Organization. '71 Any such state may at any time notify
the Secretary-General of the OAU of its intention to become a member
and, thus, "to adhere or accede to [the] Charter."'72  When this is done,
the Secretary-General communicates this notice to all the member states,
a majority of whom shall decide whether or not to admit the applicant. 73
Upon receipt of the required number of assents (26 in the present case,
there being 50 OAU members not counting the SADR), the Secretary-
General will notify the applicant state of this decision.74 Full member-
ship status then commences.
In the words of one observer: "[I]t is thought that this procedure is
simple enough to achieve speedy admission without the necessity of mak-
ing the candidate wait until the next meeting either of the Council of
Ministers or of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. ' 75 In-
Article 3
The Member States, in pursuit of the purpose stated in Article 2, solemnly affirm and
declare their adherence to the following principles: .
1. The sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its ina-
lienable right to independent existence;
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitra-
tion;
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are
still dependent;
Article 5
All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties
Article 6
The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumer-
ated in Article 3 of the present Charter.
Id.
70 T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 129.
71 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 78.
72 Id. at 83 (quoting article 28(1) of the OAU Charter).
73 Id. at art. 28(2).
74 Id.
75 T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 131.
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deed, in the case of the Western Sahara, the invitation to the SADR to
join the delegation of members was made at a meeting of the Council of
Ministers in February, 1982, by then Secretary-General of the OAU,
Edem Kodjo. 6  Kodjo has claimed in his memorandum concerning
SADR admission that article 28 of the Charter "stipulates provisions
'characterized by an automaticity that require[s] no political considera-
tions on the part of the Secretary-General.' "7 Kodjo contends he was
performing a purely ministerial duty of notification to the various parties,
a role which indeed seems dictated by the nondiscretionary language in
Article 28(2)).78
Leaving procedural questions of membership aside, certain con-
cepts, purposes, and principles are expressed repeatedly in the OAU
Charter. Among these are the concepts relating to the principle of self-
determination for all African peoples and the maintenance of the territo-
rial integrity of all states on the African continent. This is evidence of
the critical importance of these ideas to the member states. They have
acquired wide currency both inside and outside Africa; not only in the
OAU itself, but among international legal scholars and commentators as
well as others. For these reasons, it is necessary to discuss these concepts
separately in turn. This discussion will assume much added relevance
when legal arguments regarding membership in the OAU for the SADR
are presented.
2. Self-Determination
The right of colonial and other formerly dependent peoples to self-
determination is a well-established norm of international law. Self-deter-
mination has been defined as "the right of a nation to constitute an in-
dependent State and to determine its own government for itself."79 The
International Court of Justice, in its Western Sahara Advisory Opinion,
76 See AFRICA, Apr. 1982, at 36; Naldi, The Organization of African Unity and the Saharan
Arab Democratic Republic, 26 J. APR. L. 152, 157-58 (1982).
77 W. AFRICA, May 23, 1983, at 1229-30.
78 Article 28 of the OAU Charter reads:
Article 28
1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative
Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter.
2. The Administative Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such notification, communi-
cate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple
majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmit-
ted to the Administrative Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required
number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.
OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 83.
79 A. COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 45-46 (1945), quoted in Vance, Recognition
as an Affirmative Step in the Decolonization Proce.w The Case of Western Sahara, 7 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORDER 45, 45 n.1 (1980).
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defined self-determination as a need to require "a free and genuine ex-
pression of the will of the peoples concerned."8 The Court also took
note of the relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter regarding this princi-
ple, in particular, article 1, paragraph 2.81 In the United Nations itself,
the principle has received a more explicit definition in the General As-
sembly's famous Resolution 1514(XV) of 1960.82 It states, inter alia, that
"[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social, and cultural development."83 Using the above definition,
the OAU Charter stresses self-determination in the Charter Preamble as
well as in articles 2(l)(d) and 3(6);84 they speak of the Organization's
commitment to the elimination of colonialism and other forms of alien
control from Africa. Also, the provisions allude to the rights of those
formerly dependent peoples to attain independent status and conduct
their own affairs as sovereign states. In this connection, it is helpful to
recall the adherence by the OAU to the U.N. Charter, expressed in the
preambular language as well as in article 2(1)(e).85 An example of the
interaction between the U.N. and OAU Charters in the present problem
is provided by a General Assembly Resolution passed in 1980. It called
upon Morocco to withdraw from the Western Sahara, recognized the
right of the inhabitants of the territory to self-determination and inde-
pendence, and reaffirmed the principles of the U.N. and OAU
Charters.86
3. Territorial Integrity
As seen earlier, the preservation of territorial integrity in African
States finds repeated expression in the OAU Charter.87 This issue is of
prime importance in the Western Sahara situation, and therefore, it
should be appreciated that concern for the adherence to this principle is
one of the most important and overriding preoccupations on the African
legal scene. The origin of this concern is evident from an examination of
the historical background. As one writer explains:
No one who looks at the map of contemporary Africa can fail to note
the extent to which the continent is fragmented into national units,
some of them with suspiciously straight-line boundaries. The slightest
80 1975 I.C.J. at 33.
81 "To develope friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
82 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
83 Id.
84 See supra notes 59, 63 & 69.
85 Supra note 63.
86 G.A. Res. 35/19, 35 GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 213, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
87 See supra notes 59, 63 & 69 and accompanying text.
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acquaintance with African history over the past century will tell us the
apparent reason for this . . . artificiality of frontiers; the so-called
'scramble for Africa' which developed. . . when the European colo-
nial powers competed with each other to acquire territory in Africa88
The European powers have departed, but the boundaries drawn by them
still remain. Often these boundaries have little or no relation to the ra-
cial, religious, or ethno-linguistic composition of the various territorial
units. Despite the fact that some newly independent states pointed out
the "absurdity and lack of legal authority of colonial boundaries [in] Af-
rica,"8 9 the states almost universally agreed that the boundaries should
not be tampered with after independence.
The multiple OAU Charter provisions regarding the preservation of
the frontiers inherited from the colonial powers90 reflect a near complete
consensus that an attempt to redraw the borders would lead to "a new
scramble for Africa"; it was evident, to use Franck's words, that "to at-
tempt a wholesale redrawing of the map of Africa on the basis of ancient
claims or tribal links could only lead to chaos, war, and the unraveling of
the continent's State system."91 Franck also states that although the re-
spect given to colonially-drawn boundaries could lead to injustices, "es-
tablished boundaries and fixed populations, however unjustly or
serendipitously arrived at, soon develop a cohesive logic of their own that
should not be lightly overridden."92
Helping tip the scales in favor of Charter provisions supporting the
retention of existing boundaries were additional pragmatic concerns. Ev-
ident at the time of the drafting of the OAU Charter were the concerns of
"a few small African States about the intentions of one or two of their
larger neighbors . . . in matters concerning frontier disputes." 93 In
short, these states feared the assertion of historic or other claims to their
territories by their more powerful counterparts, which would result in
pressures all the more difficult to resist in the absence of specific Charter
provisions.
The commitment by the OAU to the principle of territorial integrity
88 Allot, Boundaries in Africa. A Legal and Historical Survey, in AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL HisToRy 69 (A. Mensah-Brown ed. 1975)
89 Id. at 83.
90 See supra note 87.
91 Franck, supra note 28, at 698. See also the statement by the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia at
the 1963 Summit Conference in Addis Ababa which led to the OAU's formation:
[I]f we are to redraw the map of Africa on the basis of religion, race, and language, I fear
that many States will cease to exist. It is in the interest of all Africans today to respect the
frontiers drawn on the maps, even though they were drawn by the former colonizers.
Shaw, Dispute Resolution in Africa, 1983 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 83.
92 Franck, supra note 28, at 698.
93 T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 126.
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was further strengthened in 1964, one year after the ratification of the
Charter, when an OAU Summit Conference in Cairo passed a resolution
reaffirming the Organization's advocacy of established African borders.
The resolution itself referred to article 3(3) of the Charter and said "the
borders existing on [African States'] achievement of national indepen-
dence" are to be respected by all member states.94 Taking both the Char-
ter and the 1964 Cairo Resolution into account, it can be concluded that
they "marked the acceptance by Africa of a new and definite territorial
r6gime, one based on the legal validity of the colonially-drawn
frontiers." 95
The Western Sahara's Frente POLISARIO has taken a similar posi-
tion using some of the same arguments. In a speech before the United
Nations in 1976, a representative of the POLISARIO stated:
To try to reestablish former empires or former states or even to restore
the unity of nationalities overlapping several frontiers would constitute
a source of conflicts and innumerable wars between states .... It
was in order to hold back these demons that the OAU proclaimed the
principle of respect for the frontiers of colonialism and elevated it to
the status of a dogma.96
Such a view seems entirely consistent with the previous commentary and
with the Charter of the OAU, expressing widely held and deeply felt
convictions in this area.
To summarize, self-determination is the right of all African peoples,
but that right is modified by being confined exclusively within boundaries
as they existed during the colonial period and at the time of indepen-
dence, no matter how arbitrarily those borders were originally drawn.
Anything of a separatist, irredentist, or revanchist character is by direct
94 The 1964 Cairo Resolution reads in relevant part:
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government Considering that border problems
constitute a grave and permanent factor of discension (sic),
Conscious of the existence of extra-African maneuvers aimed at dividing African
States,
Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their indepen-
dence, constitute a tangible reality,
Recalling further, that all Members have pledged, under Article VI of the Charter of
African Unity, to respect scrupulously all principles laid down in paragraph 3 of the Char-
ter of the Organization of African Unity,
(i) Solemnly reaffirms the strict respect by all Member States of the Organization for
the principles laid down in paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter of the Organization of
African Unity;
(ii) Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders
existing on their achievement of national independence.
Allot, supra note 88, at 84.
95 Shaw, supra note 91, at 164.
96 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 320 n.l.
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implication severely discouraged. 97 The principle of territorial integrity
is in fact often mentioned as the OAU's "holiest," absolutely necessary
for the continued cohesiveness and further development of African states
and the continent as a whole. How this policy of the Organization (as
expressed in legal terms) relates to OAU membership for the "state" of
Western Sahara will shortly become apparent.
D. Western Sahara: Recognition and Statehood
1. Recognition of the SADR.
It appears recognition by other states in the international legal com-
munity is not necessary for a state to exist, since criteria for statehood are
generally analyzed independently and make no mention of recognition.98
However, recognition contributes to the legitimacy of a state once it is
said to exist using generally accepted standards. This is especially so if
the state has been recognized by other members of an international or-
ganization the state seeks to enter, as is the case with the Saharan Arab
Democratic Republic. In this regard, the SADR has been diplomatically
recognized as of early 1985, by 30 African States, all of them OAU mem-
bers.99 Of course, all have acted in their sovereign capacities. World-
wide, the SADR has also fared quite well: at least 28 Asian, Latin
American and other states have already recognized it formally. There is
also the prospect of additions to the list as hopes for an early resolution
to the dispute fade.1" The 30 African States constitute the simple major-
ity needed to admit the SADR to OAU membership, per article 28(2) of
the Charter.
Beyond individual recognition by other states and the OAU itself,
general recognition provides many tangible and intangible benefits to the
9 7 Practice has reaffirmed this position. The OAU has shown that it is firmly opposed to
irredentism. . . the OAU has similarly set its face against recognizing a right of secession
in the case of independent States. . . . Resolutions that have been adopted by the OAU
have stressed the principles of national unity and territorial integrity.
Shaw, supra note 91, at 164. See also discussion regarding Biafra, infra notes 192-98 and accompa-
nying text.
98 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138-39 (1963).
99 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 308. Mauritania-one of the original claimants to the Western
Sahara-recognized the SADR in early 1984, as did Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta). W.
AFRICA, March 12, 1984, at 540. Most recently, Nigeria recognized the Saharan state in November
1984, just prior to the annual OAU Summit Conference. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1984, at A5, col. 4.
100 "In mid-November 1983, Ecuador became the 55th country around the globe to recognize
the Sawrawi State. Other Latin American countries are also reported to be close to recognizing the
SADR, with Argentina perhaps next in line." W. AFRICA, Dec. 12, 1983, at 2862. In what appears
to be a major diplomatic milestone for the SADR, the Saharan state was formally recognized by
Yugoslavia in late 1984; it became the first European country to do so. In addition: "Observers
think that Austria and Sweden. . . may soon follow suit." AFRICA, Jan. 1985, at 26. Yugoslavia
would be the 59th state to recognize the SADR.
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newly established state. Among these are the "ability to enter into treaty
relations with third States, access to foreign courts, diplomatic privileges
and immunities. . . opportunities for participation in institutes and con-
ferences, status as an International Person, [and] enhancement of inter-
national respect." 101
As important as the above benefits may be, recognition of a state by
others may have added significance when viewed in the context of the
Western Sahara and the self-proclaimed SADR; recognition is a means
of clarifying the legitimacy of a claim over a disputed territory where
competing claims exist. Crawford, in discussing territorial disputes be-
tween an occupying state and a newly constituted state regarding the
same piece of territory, quotes from Professor Jennings (after calling his
conclusion "seemingly inevitable"):
[I]f the new State ... is established with the disputed territory as its
sole territory, and its Statehood is recognized, it would seem that.an-
other claim to sovereignty over the territory is defeated. . . . A suffi-
cient number of recognitions of the new State clearly implying
recognition of its title to the disputed territory would presumably de-
stroy the claim. 10 2
Therefore, in the case of Western Sahara, recognition of the SADR by a
large number of other states (especially African states) would strongly
tend to invalidate Morocco's claim to the territory. This is in addition to
the similar effect of the I.C.J.'s Western Sahara Advisory Opinion. Fi-
nally, the recognitions would favor the legitimacy of the state itself-the
SADR.
2. The Criteria for Statehood
Given the language in articles 4 and 28 of the OAU Charter, it is
clear that membership in the Organization cannot be granted unless the
applicant constitutes an "independent sovereign African State." There-
fore, it is necessary to inquire whether the Western Sahara constitutes a
"state" within the generally accepted sense of that term, assuming-as
seems proper-that the drafters of the Charter intended the word "state"
to be interpreted in its legal sense.10 3 A widely used and well-known
definition of statehood is contained in article 1 of the Montevideo Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States; the qualifications listed are:
"(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
101 Vance, supra note 79, at 73.
102 R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY 38 (1945), quoted in J. CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 398-99 (1979).
103 See T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 129. For recognition of the fact that no definition of state-
hood is set forth in the OAU Charter itself, see W. AFRICA, May 23, 1983, at 1230.
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(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States."'" 4 A similar defi-
nition is given by section 4 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States; an entity is considered a state if it "has a
defined territory and population under the control of a government and
[the entity] engages in foreign relations." 105 Given these criteria, it is
obvious that any inquiry into whether or not a "state" exists must be
factual in nature. 06 In applying each of these standards in turn to the
Western Sahara and the SADR, each has been at least substantially satis-
fied; that is, a persuasive case exists for terming the Western Sa-
hara/SADR a state, and thus the threshold condition for OAU
membership (per OAU Charter articles 4 and 28) is fulfilled.
a.) Defined Territory
The requirement that a state possess a defined territory is the least
difficult matter to address. The area called the Western Sahara occupies
a well-defined space in northwest Africa and this land corresponds ex-
actly with the boundaries of the former Spanish Sahara. The borders are
entirely capable of delimitation despite the fact that most of them are not
currently demarcated.'0 7 Furthermore, the Western Sahara has been ad-
judged by the International Court of Justice as legally separate and dis-
tinct from Morocco or any other state.10 8  Since the extent of
governmental authority exercised within the territory is also important at
this juncture, 10 9 it bears mention once again that the Frente
POLISARIO (which has proclaimed the SADR) controls about 75 to 80
percent of the territory, and only the northern one-sixth presently re-
mains beyond its control."10 Close to this area, the POLISARIO estab-
lished a "provisional capital" where administrative and economic
activity has been resumed. Located at the outpost of Haousa, the "capi-
tal" until recently had not been attacked by Moroccan forces since
1979.111 Taken together, these factors strongly indicate that Western Sa-
hara is a distinct territorial unit, despite the occasional suggestions that
respective areas or zones of Moroccan and SADR sovereignty should be
104 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. I, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4
(1965).
106 J BRIERLY, supra note 98, at 137.
107 See T. HODGES, supra note 1, at ii (map), ix, & 55.
108 1975 I.C.J. at 67-68.
109 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 42.
110 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 290.
111 N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1981, at A6, col. 1. Haousa was apparently captured by Morocco in
mid-1984, id., June 18, 1984, at A7, col 1. A recent POLISARIO military operation is aimed at its
repossession, id., Nov. 29, 1984, at A4, col. 6.
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agreed upon.112
b.) Permanent Population
The second requirement, that the territory possess a permanent pop-
ulation, 113 is also relatively uncomplicated, if one looks to the I.C.J.'s
Advisory Opinion. In that decision, the Court found no legal ties be-
tween Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania that would affect
the right of self-determination by the native inhabitants, although the
Court noted the fact that the populace was traditionally nomadic and the
frontiers uncontrolled.114 The clear implication of the Court's findings is
that the Sahrawis have distinctive socio-political identity when compared
with the persons dwelling in Morocco and Mauritania. In addition, the
United Nations has repeatedly taken the position that the Western
Saharans are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination. 15 In
the words of one writer: "[I]f the Sahrawis can constitute a people for
the purposes of self-determination, it is inconceivable that they possess
no distinct national identity."' 6
A related problem involves the number of persons who inhabit the
Western Sahara. As stated previously, estimates of the territory's total
population very widely' 17 and many live in refugee camps (mainly in Al-
geria), where they retreated after the territory's partition and occupation
112 Proposals have been made from time to time that the Western Saharan territory be divided
between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco as part of a settlement of the dispute. The new
boundaries would be along the "useful triangle" containing the main towns and the phosphate mines
in the north. These would go, presumably, to Morocco, with the remainder going to Frente
POLISARIO. See W. AFRICA, June 20, 1983, at 1442, 1440 (map); TIME, May 15, 1982, at 42.
Several problems with this proposal make its execution difficult, unlikely, and almost certainly
undesirable from an international legal standpoint. First, each side claims the entire Western
Saharan territory. Second, the "useful triangle" has no international legal significance because its
boundaries essentially comprise the gravel walls or "berms" erected by Morocco, the occupying
state, purely as a military expedient. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1984, at A12, col. 1; id., Sept. 17, 1984, at
A3, col. 1. As evidence that the Frente POLISARIO does not accept this situation, it has concen-
trated its military resources towards penetrating the Moroccan defense walls. See W. AFRICA, Nov.
5, 1984, at 2201. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1984, at A6, col. 6; id., Nov. 29, 1984, at A4, col. 6.
Regarding the situation in the Moroccan-controlled areas, see W. AFRICA, June 20, 1983, at 1440-
43. Most importantly, this "partition" proposal, if put into effect, would violate the OAU Charter
provisions relevant to the maintenance of territorial integrity, discussed previously. See supra notes
87-97 and accompanying text. The reason for this, of course, is that the Moroccan-Western Saharan
border would no longer correspond with the boundary inherited from the Spanish colonial period.
113 Supra notes 104-05. One scholar states: "This criterion is intended to be used in associa-
tion with that of territory, and connotes a stable community." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1966).
114 1975 I.C.J. at 68.
115 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2072, 2229, 3292, supra note 26. See also G.A. Res. 35/19, supra note
46.
116 Naldi, supra note 76, at 154.
117 See T. HODGES, supra note l. at 131-32.
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in 1976. Whatever the exact number of inhabitants, or their present loca-
tion, these issues are only secondary to the actual right to self-determina-
tion; they should not form an insuperable obstacle to the exercise of that
right by the Sahrawis. Indeed, the OAU has expended much effort to
ascertain the number of Western Saharans, by using various procedures.
Specifically, these include the OAU's Ad Hoc Committee set up in 1978
and its Implementation Committee, established in 1981.11s In the con-
text of a general settlement of the conflict, there appears no reason why
these endeavors should not bear fruit.
c.) Government
The third qualification for statehood is that it should have a govern-
ment with substantial authority over the territory it seeks to represent.
Also, the population of the country "is normally required to render ha-
bitual obedience to the government." 1 9 If this is so, the governing au-
thority is considered effective and valid. This requirement is one of the
most disputed of all matters pertaining to the Western Sahara because
Morocco's main legal argument against SADR membership in the OAU
is that SADR does not constitute an "independent and sovereign State"
within the meaning of articles 4 and 28 of the Charter. 120 To support
this argument, several facts can be adduced: First, full independence has
not been attained by the self-proclaimed SADR. Second, although 75 to
80 percent of the Western Sahara is controlled by the Frente
POLISARIO, this area, for the most part, is very sparsely inhabited.
The Frente POLISARIO controlled area encompasses neither the three
main towns (Smara, Dakhla, and El-Ayoun) nor the main economic re-
sources of the territory, including the phosphate mines at Bou-Craa and
the port facilities.'2 1 All these "vital" areas are within the Moroccan
defense walls and beyond the effective reach of the SADR's putative ad-
ministration and control. 122 Last, it can be argued that the Frente
POLISARIO is purely a "liberation front," and therefore not a full-
fledged governmental structure.
These concerns can be addressed with reference to both the situation
existing in the Western Sahara itself and to prevailing international prac-
118 For discussion of these committee activities, including population count, see Naldi, supra
note 76, at 159-60. The implementation committee suggested that both the 1974 Spanish census and
the information provided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees be used as points of depar-
ture. Id. at 160. This is not to say that this task would be a simple one: for a discussion of problems
anticipated in holding a referendum in the Western Sahara, see Damis, The OA U and Western Sa-
hara, in EI-Ayouty & Zartman, supra note 55, at 282-84.
119 Naldi, supra note 76, at 155.
120 W. AFRicA, May 23, 1983, at 1229.
121 See W. AFRicA, May 7, 1984, at 970 (map).
122 But see supra note 112, and accompanying text.
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tice. First, the SADR was declared within the Western Sahara and has
operated there since its declaration of statehood in 1976. The lack of
SADR/POLISARIO control over the northern portion of the territory
appears not to extinguish statehood since there is apparently no "mini-
mum standard" or quantum of administered territory required for state-
hood. 123 This fact strongly implies flexibility in applying statehood
criteria.
Even in the absence of flexible standards, the cause of the SADR's
lack of total control over the territory is immediately apparent-the oc-
cupation of that same territory by Morocco. Again, reference must be
made to the I.C.J. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975, which de-
clared Morocco's claim to the country invalid by finding no legal ties
sufficient to support their claim of sovereignty. 124 Finally, the Frente
POLISARIO has with some success attempted on numerous occasions to
penetrate the Moroccan lines with a view towards establishing full con-
trol over the Western Sahara.1 25 As one analyst has concluded in the
Western Saharan context: "States are not extinguished by an annexation
resulting from an illegal use of force and . . a territory occupied or
annexed (illegally by force) must not, prima facie, be denied statehood if
• ..it proclaimed its independence, as long as some of the criteria of
statehood are capable of fulfillment."' 26
With regard to the contention that the Frente POLISARIO is but a
"liberation movement" and not the government of a state, it must be
conceded that obvious overlaps exist between the putative governing ap-
paratus of the SADR and the political and military functions of the
Frente POLISARIO. However, the SADR has a governmental structure
similar to those of many other states, including offices of President,
Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. It also has ministries responsible
for the full range of military and civil endeavors.' 27 The SADR exists as
a putative State partly due to the fact that independence and sovereignty
have been formally asserted.' 28
d.) Ability to Engage in Relations with other States
Another requirement of statehood pertains to the ability of the gov-
ernment to discharge it obligations under international law and engage in
relations with other states.' 29 In the present case, this inquiry is simpli-
123 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 36.
124 1975 I.C.J. at 68.
125 W. AFRICA, Nov. 5, 1984, at 2201.
126 Naldi, supra note 76, at 155. See also J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 417-20.
127 For description and charts of the SADR/POLISARIO governmental structure, see T.
HODGES, supra note 1, at 339-41.
128 See Vance, supra note 79, at 59-60.
129 See supra notes 104-05.
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fled by the presence of a well-defined SADR governing structure, with
foreign relations an integral part of that structure. 130 The SADR has
been active in diplomatic and political areas since its founding in 1976.
In addition to the recognition it has received from other states, the
SADR has relations at the ambassadorial level with states such as Mex-
ico, Cuba, and Nicaragua."' Also, the SADR has participated in pro-
ceedings of various types in both the OAU and the United Nations. This
participation can be construed in favor of statehood, an obvious necessity
for the SADR to argue its status as an entity worthy of recognition and
membership in the OAU.
e.) Independence
A further standard, not set forth in either the Montevideo Conven-
tion or the Restatement, but contained within the OAU Charter, is that a
state be "independent" in order to obtain membership.13 2 Morocco's
legal argument against granting membership to the SADR is based in
part on its contention that the Saharan state is not fully sovereign and
independent, and that in most cases OAU membership has not been
granted prior to full independent status. 133 Morocco also contends that
the SADR does not administer and control the whole territory.13 4 These
arguments are not totally devoid of foundation. One commentator real-
izes this problem and states: "It would initially appear that the SADR
fails to satisfy one of the primary requirements of independence, that of
exercising exclusive authority in the territory."' 35
Given the totality of circumstances in the Western Sahara situation,
this shortcoming on the part of the SADR is not as harmful to it as
might appear. In the first place, the lack of complete
SADR/POLISARIO control over the territory is not due to the actions
of the SADR but solely due to the actions of Morocco, namely its pres-
ence in the territory and its construction of defense walls, resulting in the
northern one-sixth of the Western Sahara being beyond the SADR's
[Clapacity or competence... depends partly on the power of internal government of a
territory, without which international obligations may not be carried into effect, and partly
on the entity concerned being separate for the purpose of such relations so that no other
entity both carries out and accepts responsibility for them.
J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 47.
130 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 340-41.
131 Naldi, supra note 75, at 156. In addition, the SADR's ambassador to Zimbabwe was for-
mally accredited in September 1984. AFRICA, Nov. 1984, at 14.
132 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 4, 28(1).
133 But see discussion regarding the former Portugese colony of Guinea-Bissau, infra notes
182-91 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
135 Naldi, supra note 76, at 156.
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reach. 136 To remedy this situation, the Frente POLISARIO is currently
engaged in military and political activities so they may bring the whole
country under its effective administration.137 Moreover, the I.C.J. in its
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion declared Morocco's claim on the ter-
ritory invalid as a matter of international law. 138 Therefore, the lack of
complete SADR control over the territory cannot be laid to any short-
comings on the part of the SADR itself.1 39
Given the admitted inability of the SADR to fulfill the literal re-
quirements of "sovereign independence," reference should be made to
the I.C.J. Opinion, the recognition by other states, and appreciation of
the rights of the Sahrawis to self-determination and independence, espe-
cially by the United Nations and the OAU. These factors can be used to
argue at least substantial compliance with the "independence" standard.
In sum: "[G]iven that the SADR is a newly emergent state consequent to
the exercise of . . . self-determination, it may be that the criterion of
independence may not be construed stringently.""
The factual assertion that the OAU has not granted membership to
states until full independence from the occupying power has been
achieved, has some validity. But in the case of Guinea-Bissau (discussed
below), 41 OAU membership was granted prior to full independence.
Also, membership was extended in the absence of complete control over
the entire territory by the organization claiming to represent the native
inhabitants. 42 This action by the OAU may have been done for reasons
related to the substantive provisions and aspects of the OAU Charter,
analogous provisions of which are important in the present case. It is
upon these Charter sections and their underlying meaning that legal ar-
guments regarding OAU membership for the SADR are based. It is to
this matter which this study now turns.
III. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF OAU MEMBERSHIP
A. General Comments
In dealing with the Organization of African Unity (or any other in-
ternational organization), reference will always necessarily be made to
the primary governing or constituent document(s) of the organization-
in the OAU's case, the Charter. As Kirgis states: "The constituent in-
136 Supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
137 Id.
138 See 1975 I.C.J. at 68.
139 Naldi, supra note 76, at 156.
140 For a brief discussion on whether the Sahrawis have indeed exercised the right of self-
determination, see id. at 156 n.21.
141 See infra, notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
142 Infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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strument of an intergovernmental organization provides the 'constitu-
tional law' of the organization and thus speaks to the organization as
such . . ,"I" Also, member states of the organization are bound by
the provisions of the governing document(s) simply by virtue of their
membership. For example, article 6 of the OAU Charter refers to the
principles of the Organization in article 3, and says that all members
"pledge themselves to observe [those principles] scrupulously." 1" In this
connection, Kirgis also asserts that "since many of the organization's de-
cisions will be made by its organs consisting. . . of member states, the
constitutional law speaks indirectly as well to those states in the sense
that it is designed to guide them as they participate in the decision-mak-
ing process." 1
4 5
Continuing along these lines, the OAU Charter is binding on all
member states and is supreme over all acts of the Organization. Also, it
is supreme over the agencies, commissions, or the like, established by the
OAU. Presumably, all actions by the Organization are taken with refer-
ence to the pertinent Charter provisions. This assumes particular import
in the OAU's case because its Charter, read with even minimal under-
standing of the background of the Organization and of the African conti-
nent, reflects concepts having special application to Africa. These are
mainly the maintenance of territorial integrity, self-determination, settle-
ment of disputes, and opposition to colonialism. 146 These concepts may
not be found in the constituent documents of other international organi-
zations. In the case of the Western Sahara, assuming the supremacy of
these and other Charter provisions (not only purely procedural ones)147
it is ensured that arguments regarding OAU membership will rest on as
solid a foundation as possible. Accepting that the Charter will and
should be used as the basis for OAU actions, the legal arguments which
follow will attempt to use the substantive language of the Charter to offer
multiple justifications favoring membership for the SADR in the OAU.
B. Granting OA U Membership to the SADR Partly to Assist in the
Adherence to the Relevant Charter Provisions, Purposes, and
Underlying Policies
In the previous discussion concerning recognition of the SADR by
other states, various benefits which accrue to that state, as a matter of
settled international law, were mentioned.'48 Likewise, benefits would
143 F. KIRGIS, supra note 40, at 76. Appropriately, his comments come at the beginning of the
section dealing with membership in international organizations.
144 See supra note 69.
145 F. KIRGIS, supra note 40, at 76.
146 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
147 In the case of membership, see OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at art. 28(2).
148 Vance, supra note 79, at 73.
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obviously exist for the SADR as a member of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity. Inter alia, these include equality with all other OAU iem-
bers, a guarantee of sovereignty within the Organization and the African
continent, non-interference in its affairs by other member states, and a
legal assurance that its established frontiers will be respected." a9 In addi-
tion, the SADR has the ability to participate and vote in all matters of
OAU concern, and has access to the various specialized commissions of
the Organization established to further the purposes of the OAU. 15 °
As crucial as these benefits are to the SADR, the OAU is much
more than this-Charter provisions and policies are involved, and they
are no less binding on members. Given this, an inquiry must be made as
to what legal benefits the OAU itself, as an international organization,
will receive by granting membership to the SADR. How will the Char-
ter, viewed in its broadest sense, including its policies, be protected and
furthered in a legal manner by the granting of membership? Do these
prospects at least partly justify membership for the SADR? Very impor-
tantly, will a grant of membership assist in the resolution of the Western
Sahara dispute? Can any prior OAU practice be found to shed light on
the above problems and provide whatever precedential value is appropri-
ate in the circumstances?
A recent article 1 ' has argued that diplomatic recognition of the
SADR by other states is an "affirmative step" towards full independence
and the decolonization of the territory, with the concomitant exercise of
the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. The author states that "recog-
nition of the SADR government-in-exile would ... serve to sanction
Morocco's non-conformity to a peremptory international norm, the right
of colonial peoples to self-determination."' 5 2 Thus stated, recognition is
seen as a device to enforce well-established general principles of interna-
tional law and to negatively sanction, by weight of diplomatic action by
states, transgressions of these principles.
Extending this reasoning further, by marshalling the available evi-
dence and including the precedents to be covered later in this papei, the
argument develops that an analogous rationale to that used to justify rec-
ognition by individual states can be applied to legally justify the granting
of membership in an international organization such as the OAU. Spe-
cifically, admission to OAU membership in the Western Sahara case is
justified when it is seen as bearing a definite and reasonable relation to
the preservation, execution, and enforcement of the relevant OAU Char-
ter provisions, and the policies which form their foundation; these relate
149 See generally OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 2(2), 3(3), 5, 6.
150 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
151 Vance, supra note 79.
152 Id. at 63.
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to self-determination, territorial integrity, and the resolution of disputes.
In a related way, membership can be entertained if the OAU perceives it
as being reasonably necessary to carry out and preserve the above Char-
ter provisions and policies. It should be emphasized at once that such a
rationale can be put into operation only if other standards, such as state-
hood and the assent of a simple majority of OAU members, 153 are met.
Also, membership will perhaps serve to sanction the offending state(s)
and to deter other states (whether or not OAU members themselves)
from violating, or attempting to violate, the OAU Charter. Under this
rubric, membership receives an additional legal rationale because sub-
stantive Charter provisions are involved. These provisions, stated
above, 15 4 are the undisputed "constitutional law" of the OAU and thus
dictate and guide acts done, or policies adopted, by the Organization.
The formulation just put forth, when actually used, will extend the
"affirmative step" rationale by carrying the effects and legal justifications
from individual recognition by OAU members and other states and
translating them into making the SADR an integral part of the OAU.
This constitutes an event which amounts to considerably more than the
sum of individual states' recognition. Regardless of the individual rea-
sons for any state recognizing the SADR, OAU membership provides a
reference point relating to specific Charter sections and the policies sur-
rounding them. Quite possibly, these are not found in the governing doc-
uments or other legal repertories of individual states. This will,
hopefully, further strengthen those provisions and policies and provide a
measure of sanction to violators. Due to the "supra-national" legal char-
acter of the OAU and the overarching Charter language to which all
member states agree to adhere, the Organization becomes, in a legal
sense at least, more than simply a collection of sovereign African
States.155
It does not of course follow that the analysis of this problem is at an
end. On the contrary, it will be necessary to briefly restate, further ex-
plore, and apply the above to the Western Sahara/SADR situation re-
garding OAU membership. The following will probe the relationship
between the legalities and underlying policies found in the Charter and
the facts in the present case. It will transport the SADR membership
argument from the theoretical to the practical and in the process further
clarify that rationale.
As discussed at length earlier, 156 the right of colonial and dependent
153 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 4, 28(2).
154 Supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
155 This idea has been carried to an extreme by one scholar who has stated in a different con-
text, that "after all, there is no OAU; there are only members." Zartman, The OA U in the African
State System: Interaction and Evaluation in El-Ayouty & Zartman, supra note 55, at 41.
156 Supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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peoples to self-determination is firmly embedded in international law.
The OAU's adherence to this principle finds expression in the Preamble
of the Charter as well as in articles 2(l)(d) and 3(6), which relate to the
Organization's commitment to the elimination of colonialism from Af-
rica.' 57 The granting of OAU membership to SADR would be one way
of attempting to ensure that this right is realized for the indigenous in-
habitants of the Western Sahara because of the explicit, strongly worded
Charter language and the partitioning of the Sahrawis' territory between
Morocco and Mauritania in 1975 by the claimant states and Spain. 158
Morocco still holds the territory keeping the "legacy" of Spanish coloni-
alism in existence. Neither the Sahrawi people nor their apparent repre-
sentative, the Frente POLISARIO, have been genuinely consulted about
their wishes at any point in the entire affair.159 Also, the fact that the
Sahrawis are not generally considered to be Moroccan or Mauritanian in
origin should be kept in mind.' In the face of acts by Morocco that
denigrate the right to self-determination of the Saharan people, OAU
membership rests on secure ground if granted to reaffirm this principle
and activate the appropriate Charter provisions. This assumes that the
criteria for statehood and procedural questions are substantially met.
The relationship between OAU membership used to execute provi-
sions of the Charter and self-determination is bolstered by the expressed
adherence by the OAU to the United Nations Charter, and by extension,
the activities of the International Court of Justice, the U.N.'s main judi-
cial body.' 6 ' Recall that in 1975, the I.C.J. held in its Advisory Opinion
that the Western Sahara, having no legal ties with neighboring states suf-
ficient to modify the inhabitants' right to self-determination, was entitled
to independence squarely under this principle.' 62 Although the I.C.J.
Opinion was rendered before the partition of the territory and the decla-
ration of independence by the Frente POLISARIO, there is every reason
to believe that the decision still has persuasive force. The objective con-
ditions which motivated the U.N. General Assembly's request for an Ad-
visory Opinion still exist, only with a different "colonial" occupier-
Morocco in place of Spain. These conditions include lack of self-determi-
nation by the Sahrawi people and occupation by an outside state, whose
territorial claim the I.C.J. specifically declared invalid.
157 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 2(1)(d), 3(6).
158 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 223-24.
159 Id.
160 Supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
161 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at preamble, art. 2(1)(e). For an example of the U.N.'s
recognition of the OAU and its Charter, see supra note 86.
162 1975 I.C.J. at 68. One commentator has said that although the principle of self-determina-
tion was already well established, "the Western Sahara case makes the clearest judicial statement to
date with regard to self-determination as a legal right." Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 1978 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 118, 153 n.3.
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The possible deterrent effect of OAU membership for the SADR is
immediately apparent. Granting membership to anchor more securely of
self-determination for Africans will accomplish at least two things: First,
it will place the Organization firmly on record as holding the right of self-
determination as fundamental as well as continuing evidence of the
OAU's vigorous disapproval of the denial of this right. Secondly, it will
indicate to all concerned and to the international legal and political com-
munity at large that the OAU continues to be fully alert to the impor-
tance of these Charter provisions and policies. Hopefully, this will give
pause to those who contemplate violating the Charter and will provide an
enhanced foundation for future OAU actions regarding self-determina-
tion, if and when they become necessary.
As for the preservation of territorial integrity of African States, the
OAU's grant of membership to the SADR is even more compelling if
seen as partly executing and strengthening Charter provisions and poli-
cies. As emphasized earlier,x63 self-determination under the OAU Char-
ter is subject to one major specific qualification: the borders inherited
from the colonial period, however haphazardly drawn from the African
point of view, must remain sacrosanct, making self-determination con-
fined to previously-defined physical borders. This principle merits men-
tion in the Charter's preambular language as well as in articles 2(l)(c)
and 3(3).164 It was further operationalized in the resolution passed at the
OAU Summit Conference held in Cairo in 1964.16
In the Western Sahara, the situation is as follows: a member state of
the OAU, the Kingdom of Morocco, has occupied the territory by force
of arms and refers to it as its "Saharan Provinces" 16 6 Its historically-
based claim to the country has been found wanting by the I.C.J. after a
careful review of the matter.167 This annexation of the Western Sahara
has produced a drastic change in the boundaries of the region. Specifi-
cally, the border between Morocco and the ex-Spanish Western Sahara,
formerly an international one, has for all intents and purposes been
erased from the map by the occupying State. In those territorial areas
which Morocco controls, the land's administration and identity are inte-
gral with Morocco proper.168 No attempt is made to maintain that the
territory is anything but purely Moroccan.
Given this state of affairs, membership in the OAU for the SADR is
justified as a legal step to maintain present frontiers and possibly to pre-
163 Supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
164 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 77-78.
165 Allott, supra note 88, at 84.
166 See, W. AFRICA, March 12, 1984, at 541.
167 1975 I.C.J. at 68. See also supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
168 See V. THOMPSON & R. ADLOFF, supra note 19, at 293-94; T. HODGES, supra note 1, at
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vent future "irredentist" claims by Morocco and other African States.
OAU membership can be seen not only as an affirmative step in the
decolonization process, but as a conscious, legally-grounded interposition
against all states in violation of the OAU Charter. More to the point, it
will be an interposition not only against the violating state, but in favor
of the native inhabitants of the Western Sahara. These people apparently
desire independence and their representative, the Frente POLISARIO,
has made clear, by words and actions, the existence of a sovereign state.
Although this state (the SADR) has not achieved full independence or
evicted the occupying state from the entire territory, it stands for the
continued preservation of established, present African boundaries, in
contrast to Morocco's position.
Moreover, the SADR has done this with a reasonable degree of per-
manence and has shown evidence of its ability to conduct itself in the
international community on a par with most, if not all, other states.
169
OAU membership for the SADR will, by activating the appropriate
Charter provisions, act as a statement in favor of the continued existence
of the Western Sahara as a distinct territorial entity as well as a polit-
ical/international legal unit.
The possible sanctioning effects of this action should also be men-
tioned. The granting of membership to the SADR will be a legal riposte
against the occupying state, in this case, Morocco. Also, membership
will be a concrete expression of the OAU's attitude on the crucial matter
of territorial integrity and the inviolability of the frontiers inherited from
colonialism. This offers at least some chance of offsetting whatever suc-
cess the occupying state achieves in the military sphere, or any diplo-
matic or military support it may receive from outside powers. In fact,
the weight of OAU action may serve to dissuade these states from assist-
ing the occupier in its attempts to remain in the Western Sahara.
The use of OAU membership as a sanction acquires special impor-
tance when it is realized that nowhere in the Charter are there provisions
for formal sanctioning procedures (such as economic, political, or mili-
tary sanctions) or providing for the expulsion of member states from the
Organization.17 Only a voluntary withdrawal provision for members is
169 For example, the SADR engages in independent foreign policy initiatives such as the exten-
sive African diplomatic tour by the SADR's president the month before the 20th annual OAU Sum-
mit Conference (held November 12-15, 1984 in Addis Ababa). The trip was intended to secure
support for the seating of the SADR as an OAU member at the meeting. W. AnucA, Nov. 5, 1984,
at 2201-02.
170 See generally OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 76-84. During the drafting of the Charter in
1963, at least some thought was given to including apparatus for expulsion: "In the Charter debate
a Senegalese delegate did raise the question of giving the OAU power to expel a Member State if
[it] did not respect its obligations, but the matter was not pursued." Wolfers, The Institutional
Evolution of the OAU, in El-Ayouty & Zartman, supra note 55, at 95.
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found in the Charter. 171
Another persuasive rationale for OAU membership to preserve ter-
ritorial integrity is provided by the situation in northwest Africa itself.
For a variety of political and nationalistic reasons unrelated to interna-
tional law, Morocco has, with varying degrees of earnestness since its
independence from France in 1956, claimed territories outside its recog-
nized frontiers. 172 These include not only the Western Sahara, but all of
Mauritania, a large portion of western Algeria, and portions of Mali
(which lies far to the southeast).173 Claiming Mauritania was historically
Moroccan, Morocco refused for ten years to extend diplomatic recogni-
tion to Mauritania after its independence in 1960.174 With this in mind,
the assiduous maintenance of existing African frontiers by the OAU is
furthered by SADR membership in the Organization.
Finally, granting membership in the OAU for the SADR may be
justified as an attempt to facilitate the final resolution of the conflict be-
tween the parties. Since elevation to membership means equality with
other member states, 175 dispute resolution could move to a different
plane: for example negotiations among juridical equals rather than be-
tween a state and a "liberation movement" or "front." This desire to
clarify the identities of the parties evidently played a part in the OAU's
decision to admit the SADR to membership in early 1982. Faced with
Morocco's continuing contention that "for us the POLISARIO does not
exist either legally or internationally,"'176 and that "the Saharan conflict
is first and above all [an] Algerian-Moroccan conflict, 177 the OAU may
have felt the need to take strong legal action by granting membership to
sharpen the parties' respective positions. This was done notwithstanding
negotiations either attempted or already in progress, using the apparatus
set up by the Organization itself, such as the Implementation Commit-
tee.' 78 In his memorandum on SADR membership, OAU Secretary-
General Edem Kodjo stated that "[t]he SADR's admission was 'the di-
rect result' of the failure to name the 'parties to the conflict' at the
preceeding Implementation Committee meeting."'179 The fact that nego-
171 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at art. 32.
172 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 85-91.
173 See map of "Greater Morocco," ia at 87.
174 Id at 89-90, 116-17.
175 See OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 3(1), 5.
176 N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1982, at A3, col. 2.
177 W. AFRICA, Dec. 12, 1983, at 2861 (emphasis added). Algeria is the
SADR/POLISARIO's principal outside backer.
178 The Implementation Committee is composed of representatives from seven OAU member
states. It is charged with so-far unsuccessful attempts to institute a cease-fire, install a neutral in-
terim peacekeeping force, and hold a referendum in the Western Sahara to ascertain the wishes of
the population. Naldi, supra note 76, at 159-60.
179 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 321 n.31 (opinion of Edem Kodjo).
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tiation efforts have been unsuccessful to date should not obscure this ad-
ditional rationale for membership status.
C. Precedents in the OA U and Africa
The SADR, as stated previously, substantially meets most of the
statehood requirements of international law.180 However the territory is
not fully independent, because the administration of the SADR is admit-
tedly not present in the highly populated centers, and no agreement has
been reached between the nascent state and the occupying state to facili-
tate full sovereignty and independence in those areas. In addition, the
governing body of the SADR-the Frente POLISARIO-bears an argu-
able resemblance to a "liberation front" entity.1 81
In spite of these countervailing factors, in a recent instance, Guinea-
Bissau, a territory which had neither achieved full independence nor
fully ejected the colonial power was not only recognized as a state, but
was admitted to full OAU membership. In a second case, that of Biafra,
a portion of a recognized OAU member seceded and declared itself an
independent state. In both instances, the OAU's previous behavior sup-
ports the rationale for membership for the SADR, since the possible sub-
stantive legal justifications grounded in the Charter appear to be
significantly related.
1. Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau, a small West African country, had been a Portu-
guese colony for centuries. 182 A group known as the PAIGC, 183 claim-
ing to represent the indigenous people of the territory, was founded in
1956. They began guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese in 1963 and,
by 1970, "claimed to have liberated a large part of the country.. 84 Over
time, Portuguese control was reduced to the capital city of Bissau, its
nearby airfield and military base, and a few smaller towns; the PAIGC
controlled the remainder. On September 26, 1973, the PAIGC formally
declared Guinea-Bissau to be a sovereign state. It was soon diplomati-
cally recognized as such by about 40 states around the world, including
the U.S.S.R. and India.'85 Two months later, Guinea-Bissau was admit-
ted to OAU membership at a meeting of the Organization held in Addis
Ababa. 8 6 However, the PAIGC did not reach agreement with Portugal
180 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
181 See T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 339-41.
182 See G. FREEMAN-GRENVILLE, supra note 22, at 30-31, 46.
183 Portugese acronym for the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands.
184 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 105, at 260. See DAVIDSON, THE LIBERATION OF GUINEA
(1969).
185 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 260.
186 El-Ayouty & Zartman, supra note 55, at 376.
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facilitating full independence until August 1974.187 Guinea-Bissau fi-
nally became independent on September 10, 1974.188 Thus: "[T]here
was a parallel in the OAU's history for the admission of a state with...
partial control over its territory, namely, the entry of Guinea-Bissau into
the OAU. . . a year before Portugal's withdrawal." '189
This "premature" grant of membership to Guinea-Bissau had a
threefold foundation: (1) fulfillment of the criteria for statehood, (2) the
concurrence of a majority of OAU member states, and most importantly,
(3) the strong policy set forth in the substance of the Charter, of the
desirability and urgency of ridding the African continent of colonial-
ism. 190 This policy enjoys universal support from OAU members, they
themselves being mostly ex-colonies. Admission to full membership
most likely was given to accelerate the departure of Portuguese colonial-
ism from Africa; this is evidenced by the fact that Portugal's other colo-
nies were not given independence until well after Guinea-Bissau achieved
that status. 191 Endowing the PAIGC government with the OAU's im-
primatur activated the relevant Charter language and the anti-colonial
policy upon which it is based. This is evidence of the Organization's
"absolute dedication" to the total and permanent removal of the Portu-
guese presence, and its desire that the people of Guinea-Bissau achieve
full self-determination at the earliest possible time.
2. Biafra
The Eastern Region of Nigeria broke away from that country and
declared its independence as the "Republic of Biafra" on May 30, 1967.
Its "statehood" was terminated, however, by Nigerian military and polit-
ical means in January 1970.192 Very few states recognized Biafra (Craw-
ford says the number is five) and the prevailing view among nations was
that Biafra did not meet the essentials of statehood. 193 From the begin-
ning, "[T]he OAU took a strong [stand] condemning secession in any
Member State. . . and a mission was sent to Nigeria to emphasize the
desire of the OAU Assembly for the territorial integrity, unity, and peace
in Nigeria."194 Furthermore, in September 1969 the sixth OAU Assem-
187 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 261.
188 L. HENDERSON, ANGOLA: FIVE CENTURIES OF CONFLICT 253 n.87 (1979).
189 T. HODGES, supra note 1, at 321 n.13. In addition, the case of Guinea-Bissau was cited by
the president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, as precedent for the SADR's admission to OAU
membership. W. AFRICA, Nov. 19, 1984, at 2304.
190 See, OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at arts. 2(1)(d), 3(6).
191 Of Portugal's other colonies, Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975, the Cape
Verde Islands on June 5, 1975, Sao Tome and Principe on July 12, 1975, and finally Angola on
November 11, 1975. L. HENDERSON, supra note 188, at 253 n.87.
192 Shaw, supra note 91, at 157-58.
193 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 265.
194 Shaw, supra note 91, at 157.
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bly adopted a resolution exhorting both sides "to agree to preserve in the
overriding interests of Africa the unity of Nigeria."' 95 Interestingly,
when Biafra capitulated to the Federal Nigerian government, both sides
referred to that resolution. 196
The conclusion to be drawn from the OAU's attitude is obvious: its
primary motivations were the Charter provisions and policies relating to
the preservation of existing African borders.' 97 The OAU was seeking,
by its actions, to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria, to give Ni-
geria added legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and
deter other states from recognizing Biafra. 9 ' Lastly, the OAU's behav-
ior was probably intended to dissuade other states, or secessionist groups
within states, from asserting similar claims to sovereignty outside the
confines of the OAU Charter.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing analysis, more has been done than simply examine
the general character and membership apparatus of a major international
organization. While membership questions were constantly alluded to,
this paper ventured farther afield into areas of general international law.
Inquiry was made into the law of statehood and recognition, the opinion
by the I.C.J. (the main judicial organ of the United Nations), and the
policies inside and outside the OAU Charter which form the bedrock of
that governing document. Together with a grounding in the facts of the
Western Sahara situation, arguments relating to the admission of the
SADR to OAU membership were made. These contentions, all legally-
based, were presented with the conviction that SADR's membership
would rest on a solid juridical basis if recourse was had to broader sub-
stantive provisions of the OAU Charter.
Prominent among these were Charter provisions pertaining to self-
determination, territorial integrity, and the pacific settlement of disputes.
In this process, it was necessary to go outside the strict language of the
Charter to locate and examine the policies which lie at its foundation.
Without an inquiry into these (including commentary by scholars and
others), any reasoned legal analysis of the Western Sahara problem
195 Id. at 158.
196 Id. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Biafran situation (much of it quite critical
of the OAU's role) see Kouassi, The OA U and International Law, in EI-Ayouty & Zartman, supra
note 55, at 50-51. See also Zartman, supra note 155, at 39-40. Zartman, however, says the OAU was
"eminently successful in defending the principle of State intangibility, giving Nigeria the time, sup-
port, and legitimacy to take care of the secessionist threat." Id. at 39.
197 OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at preamble, arts. 2(1)(c), 3(3), 6.
198 In 1968, "the [OAU] Assembly called on member States of the OAU and the U.N. to
refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity, and territorial integrity of Nigeria." Shaw,
supra note 91, at 158.
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would quickly have broken down, leaving the reader no closer to a possi-
ble solution to the conflict. Given this line of exploration, and consider-
ing the matter as a whole, the writer is of the opinion that the OAU did
not act erroneously in granting membership to the SADR in 1982.
At the time of this writing, the Organization seems no longer
threatened with disintegration or deadlock over the Western Sahara is-
sue. Representatives of the SADR took their seats at the 20th OAU
Summit in Addis Ababa November 12-15, 1984, without substantial op-
position. 199 In 1982 and 1983, the SADR had temporarily and volunta-
rily withdrawn from OAU participation in the interests of unity,20 0 a
move which was no more than an interim solution. Viewed on the sur-
face then, this analysis can be perceived as retrospective.
The wider context of the issue points in a different direction. Re-
sponding to the seating of the SADR as an OAU member, Morocco
withdrew from the Organization in protest.2 °1 Presumably this was done
pursuant to Article 32 of the Charter, so that termination of Moroccan
membership would be effective in one year's time.2 2 Moreover, the mili-
tary situation shows no sign of abating, and a solution in that regard is no
closer to realization. In short, this chain of events means a possibly pro-
tracted and even more violent conflict, distracting attention from Africa's
other extremely serious problems. Also, the OAU is faced with immi-
nent loss of an important North African member state, with effects on
the Organization (and the region) that now can only be speculated upon.
In closing, it should be emphasized that, to assist in the resolution of
this dispute, as well as others, international law and the OAU Charter
should be as neutral and broad-based as possible in order to find a promi-
nent place in the legal and policy decisions of African states and the
OAU itself. The overall objective: to strengthen the Organization and
facilitate the joint efforts urgently needed for Africa to finally overcome
the effects of its colonial past and realize its present and future aspira-
tions as they are so eloquently set forth in the Charter. Hopefully, then,
199 AFRIcAsIA, Dec. -1984, at 32-35. See also W. AFRICA, Nov. 19, 1984, at 3204-05.
200 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1982, at A5, col. 1.
201 Id., Nov. 13, 1984, at A6, col. 5. Zaire also "suspended" its participation in the OAU as a
gesture of support for Morocco.
202 Article 32 of the OAU Charter reads as follows:
Article 32
Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notifica-
tion to the Administrative Security-General. At the end of one year from the date of such
notification, if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply to the renouncing State,
which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organization.
OAU CHARTER, supra note 8, at 84. The purpose of the one year provision is "to enable both the
renouncing State and the Organization to have time to adjust all outstanding rights and obligations."
T. ELIAS, supra note 53, at 132. Also, the period exists "to allow other States to urge second
thoughts on the Member withdrawing." Wolfers, supra note 170, at 195.
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the maximum beneficial degree of development in the legal, material, and
human realms will accrue to the continent of Africa.
